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This paper explores the changing relationship of diaspora to the homeland. In 
particular, this article focuses on the changing relationship of pro-North Korea, 
Zainichi Koreans (Koreans in Japan) towards North Korea. Many Koreans in Japan 
continue to identify with North Korea, but the nature of this relationship has changed, 
due to shifting generational attitudes towards both the host society and North Korea. 
A dance recital I witnessed in an ethnic Korean high school in Japan exemplifies 
these changes. I suggest that the symbols highlighted within the recital articulate a 
particular form of political-ethnic identity that is characterised by a long distance 
nationalism, but without the desire to return to the homeland. Based on a year of 
ethnographic fieldwork with members of the pro-North Korea organisation, 
Ch'ongry┙n, this paper explores how diasporic groups construct, negotiate, and 
reproduce identity in relation to nation states and transnational processes.  
   
Keywords: Diaspora; identity; affective transnational longing; Zainichi Korean; 
North Korea; Japan  
 
 
On a sunny spring day in 2014, the ‘Chae-Ilbon Chos┙nin Ch'ongry┙n haphoe’ 
(Ch'ongry┙n/Ch┗sen S┗ren) school in Chuo-ku, Kobe opened its doors to family and 
                                                        
1 Dr. Markus Bell is a lecturer at the University of Sheffield’s School of East Asian Studies 
(SEAS). His research examines contemporary and Cold War migration between North Korea 
and Japan. He has published extensively on the topic of North Korean migrants in South 
Korea and in third countries. Correspondence to: Markus Bell, Office A-02, 6-8 Shearwood 
Road, School of East Asian Studies, The University of Sheffield S10 2TD, UK. Email: 
Markus.Bell@sheffield.ac.uk ORCID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2364-3730  
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friends of students for the annual school fete. Following the Japanese government’s 
announcement that i would exclude all ‘North Korean schools’ from statewide 
funding2, parents at the Kobe school hoped that is year’s event would raise funds for 
purchasing materials and the upkeep of the school’s buildings. Over the course of an 
afternoon that was characterised by the consumption of Korean food and Japanese 
beer, I joined parents of students from pre-school to high school age in observing 
highly choreographed dances, songs, and skits. Of the performances that afternoon, 
one in particular captured the audience’s attention: a dance by a group of high school 
girls dressed in traditional Korean dresses (hanbok/ch'ima ch┙gori). I suggest that the 
symbolism within the recital reflected the changing attitude of pro-North Korea 
Zainichi Koreans3 towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North 
Korea). The performance articulated an identity4 characterised by what I refer to as a 
transnational affective longing5 , in which members of Ch'ongry┙n imagine 
                                                        
2 See a 2014 report by Matthew Carney in ABC News. 
3 I use the term ‘Zainichi Korean’ to refer to Koreans who migrated to Japan from the 
Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) until the Korean War (1950-1953). In Japanese 
‘Zainichi’ means ‘residing in Japan’. The expression ‘Zainichi Korean’ has been appropriated 
by long-term ethnic Koreans to distinguish them from the Japanese population and from later 
waves of ‘Newcomer’ migrants from South Korea. 
4 This article understands identity as, ‘a process of ongoing social interaction in which people 
are agents in shaping their identification through a dialectic process with other actors and with 
the material world around them’ (Bell 2018, 7). 
5 In this article I use the expression ‘transnational’ to refer to the social and cultural 
connections that people create and maintain across long distances. For more on 
transnationalism see Steven Vertovec (2001, 2009).  
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themselves existing in a state of exile from the homeland, but without the attendant 
desire to return. 
This paper asks what the relationship between ethnic identity, exile, and 
performance reveals about new forms of nationalism and identity in the post-Cold 
War world. Discussions with interlocutors suggested that many members of 
Ch'ongry┙n continue to identify North Korea as the homeland, but that the nature of 
this relationship has changed.6 The change in this relationship is due primarily to a 
growing number of Zainichi Koreans naturalising as Japanese or South Korean 
citizens, and to the declining membership of the organisation as a consequence. This 
article borrows from Aihwa Ong’s (1996) understanding of citizenship as a cultural 
process of ‘subject-ification’ (Foucault 1989, cited in Ong 1996, 737), whereby 
people become subjects of a national community through a dialectical relationship of 
‘self-making’ and ‘being made’ with the nation state. I take a Ch'ongry┙n school 
performance as a starting point for my analysis of the emerging relationship of 
diasporic Koreans to North Korea. In the past, such performances presented a utopic 
return to the homeland7 , reflecting a communally experienced aspiration of 
Ch'ongry┙n affiliated Koreans. I suggest that contemporary performances reflect both 
                                                        
6 Although reports in the media often refer to this community as ‘North Koreans in Japan’, 
this is a misunderstanding because Koreans who affiliate and/or sympathise with North Korea 
do not have North Korean citizenship. Ryang explains that, ‘Technically speaking, there can 
be no North Koreans in Japan, for the Japanese government makes no diplomatic 
acknowledgement of North Korea’ (2009, 9). 
7 The idea of homeland for many Zainichi Koreans who politically sympathise with North 
Korea is complicated by the fact that the majority of these individuals trace their origins to 
what became South Korea in 1948.  
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a longing for North Korea8 and recognition that for Zainichi Koreans in modern day 
Japan, the aspiration to migrate to the homeland will remain unrealised. Th  shifting 
symbolism embodied in the performance I witnessed and the formal and informal 
discussions I had with Ch'ongry┙n members reflect an understanding ofthe nation as 
an invented cultural and political state (Gellner 2006, 47) and further, as a long 
distance, imagined communion between individuals, most of whom will never meet 
(Anderson 2006, 6). Consequently, these cultural processes illuminate a critical aspect 
of the communally imagined relationship of Ch'ongry┙n members to the DPRK, and 
can be conceived of as a cultural and political practice whereby Ch'ongry┙n members 
engage in dialectic communion with the North Korean state to reconfigure the terms 
of their belonging.  
This paper is based on a year of ethnographic fieldwork, including semi-
structured interviews with Ch'ongry┙n members in Kobe, Osaka, and Tokyo, and 
participant observation in two Ch'ongry┙n schools and one South Korea-affiliated 
school9. I explore how diasporic groups construct, negotiate, and reproduce a form of 
                                                        
8 The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, ‘Ch'ongry┙n’ in Korean and 
‘Ch┗sen S┗ren’ in Japanese is one of two main organisations for Zainichi Koreans and has 
close ties to North Korea. Ch'ongry┙n functions as North Korea's de facto embassy in Japan. 
For more information on this organisation refer to the C 'ongry┙n webpage: 
http://www.chongryon.com/  
9 I used qualitative methods, including participant observation and semi-structured interviews 
to research the lives of ethnic Koreans residing in Japan. I observed and participated in school 
open days and met with Ch'ongry┙n members for informal interviews. I draw on interlocutor 
responses from semi-structured interviews and in-depth conversations with 10 members of 
Ch'ongry┙n in Osaka, Kobe, and Tokyo. Following my fieldwork in Japan I spent a month in 
the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), carrying out research 
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long distance ‘cultural citizenship’ (Ong 1996), in which they reimagine the terms of 
their belonging to the homeland. The first section provides ethnographic evidence and 
analysis of a dance recital that I suggest is emblematic of this changing relationship. 
Section two examines the development of ethnic Korean education in Ch'ongry┙n 
institutions and the factors that have shaped the lives of Koreans in Japan. The third 
section examines the affective value of North Korea for this community, rethinking 
the DPRK along similar lines to the rural hometown that has largely vanished in 
Japan’s rush to modernity. The final section discusses shifting understandings of 
belonging to the homeland, in which Ch'ongry┙n members acknowledge the debt 
accrued for North Korean support, but without the accompanying ideology of return. 
 
Ethnic Identity in the Spotlight 
 
The shift in ethnic Korean identity and imagined communion with the homeland are 
particularly evident in the performances and symbols presented in Ch'ongry┙n schools 
today. During the open day, the main hall of the Kobe Ch'ongry┙n school is crowded 
with parents, staff, and school supporters.10 The air is filled with the smells of food 
and alive with the sounds of eating, talking, and laughing. I follow my hosts to a table 
in front of the stage, where we are heartily welcomed by two middle-aged men, Mr 
Yamada and Mr Han. They smile encouragingly as we exchange introductions in a 
blend of Korean and Japanese. We discuss the relationship of Ch'ongry┙n to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
on Zainichi Koreans in Japan and the mass migration of some 90,000 Koreans from Japan to 
North Korea. 
 
10 The occasion for this event was a Ch'ongry┙n school fund raising ‘bazaar’.  
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Japanese government and Mr Han tells me that the government funding cuts have 
taken a toll on his family. From next year, he explains, he will have to send his 
youngest child to a Japanese school. Both men tell me that they were educated in 
Ch'ongry┙n institutions and both had grandparents who migrated from Cheju Island 
during the colonial period (1910-1945). Our conversation is interrupted as a class of 
kindergarten students takes the stage for the first performance. 
 Throughout the day, parents move back and forth between the seating and the 
food stalls as their children participate in Korean drumming, accordion playing, 
traditional song and dance, martial arts displays, and a skit involving Power 
Rangers.11 In the early afternoon, a dance troupe of six girls glide on to the stage. One 
of the girls sets up a board and takes her place in front of it. It is possible to clearly 
make out a map of the Korean peninsula. Three large, coloured stars are attached to 
the map. A blue star covers Mount Paektu, on the Chinese-Korean border. This star is 
large enough that its arms reach into China. Over Pyongyang, the North Korean 
capital, there is a bright red star of the same size and shape. At the bottom of the map, 
below the Korean peninsula, is a yellow star. The third star marks Cheju Island, the 
southern most point of South Korea.12    
 
Figure 1: A Dancer Gestures to the Map of the Korean Peninsula. 
                                                        
11 The performances I observed in Ch'ongry┙n schools were an inversion of those I observed 
in a South Korea-affiliated school in Osaka. In the ‘South Korean’ school there were only two 
traditional Korean cultural performances throughout the entire day. The majority of 
performances were K-pop dances, American love songs, or skits performed in English.  
12 It is likely that the star over Cheju Island reflects the high number of Zainichi Koreans in 
this community who trace their ancestry back to the island.   
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The lead dancer is frozen whilst indicating towards the map (see figure 1). The others 
wait expectantly in the centre of the stage. Offstage, the first strains of string music 
fill the air and the dancers turn their heads in the direction of the Korean peninsula. 
Their faces flood with expressions of joy as the performer next to the map gestures 
towards each of the three stars. The lone dancer looks back and forth between the 
performers and the map of Korea and mimes instructing the students as the music 
pitter-patters along. The dancers communicate a carefree mood, as they gaze in 
adoration toward the ‘teacher’. The lead dancer then tiptoes rapidly over to the 
waiting students who rise up to greet her. Immediately the dancers merge and their 
movements synchronise. They dance with gusto, vacillating to and from the image of 
Korea, performing a moment of turbulence and chaos. From off-stage, a teacher hands 
each performer a large piece of plain, white paper. The dancers use dramatic gestures 
to fold their paper into an airplane. The lead dancer, who had been miming the role of 
teacher, gestures to each of the other performers to approach the image of Korea.  
 
Figure 2: Students Perform the Carefree Moments Before Exodus From the Homeland 
 
One by one, the lead dancer encourages each student to ‘take off’ from one of the 
sites on the map—Mount Paektu, Pyongyang, Cheju Island. With great effort the 
dancers launch away from the Korean peninsula and out into the open stage. Each 
airplane immediately finds itself in trouble, expressed by a dancer struggling to 
control her plane, and each subsequently crashes to its doom moments after departing 
Korea.  
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After the final airplane spirals into the ocean, the dancers reassemble. The 
tightly bound group moves as one, swaying to and from the audience. The writhing 
human bodies gather momentum as the music builds. From behind the curtain a huge 
cardboard airplane emerges, its structure painted with brightly coloured stripes that 
resemble the patterns of a traditional Korean dress. Each dancer grasps a piece of the 
much larger, sturdier airplane. In a coordinated, sweeping gesture the rainbow-
decorated plane bursts away from the map. The larger plane, guided by the dancers’ 
concerted efforts, soars high above the stage. The music, initially wavering, reaches a 
crescendo and the dancers return to centre stage for a final hurrah. The audience 
erupts into applause as the performers bow and glide off the stage. 
 
Figure 3: Dancers Celebrate as the Korean Plane Soars High Above the Stage. 
 
Performance, as a cultural representation, offers unique insights into the political, 
economic, and historical relationship of diaspora to the homeland (Cf. Turino 2008; 
Aparicio and Jáquez 2003; Zheng 2010; Carstensen-Egwuom 2011; Knudsen 2011; 
Silverman 2012; Koo 2014, 2016). Song and dance can be presented as symbols of 
personal and communal ethnic-nationalist resistance (Tsuda 2000), as a ‘hybrid 
practice’ through which minority groups draw on symbols of the global in reshaping 
locally embedded discourses (Knudsen 2011), and as a means by which immigrant 
groups integrate themselves into the host society by conspicuously performing their 
foreignness to the majority society (Carstensen-Egwuom 2011, 131). Sunhee Koo, 
referencing Thomas Turino (2008), explains, ‘As cultural representations, music and 
dance have played effective roles in marking, reinforcing, and constructing a nation or 
national identity’ (in Koo 2016, 389-390). Often, immigrants are regarded solely as a 
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source of social and economic problems for the host society, but a focus on cultural 
representations such as song, dance, and storytelling allows for the emergence of new 
narratives that speak to the ‘aesthetic intersections between the local and the global 
and between agency and identity’ (Kiwan and Meinhof 2011, 4).  
In North Korea, the line demarcating the stage from the public realm is 
blurred. North Korean music, theatre, and performance, connecting the political and 
the everyday, emerged through former North Korean leader Kim Jong-il ’s interest in 
propaganda and political representation. Within North Korea, cultural representations 
are highly political, for example, following the ascent of Kim Jong-un to power 
(2011-) and the attendant purges of his rivals, political messages reinforcing the 
authority of the young leader were communicated in hastily assembled songs and 
widely printed lyrics (Cathcart and Korhonen 2017, 5-7).  
A common feature of North Korean productions, from onstage performance to 
everyday life, is the importance of affective value. In particular, the colonial 
experience and attendant loss of nation are motifs crosscutting North Korean screen, 
stage, and musical performances. The Arirang Mass Games are the most well known 
of North Korean state performances. In a production involving tens of thousands of 
dancers, singers, and athletes, participants tell a story of colonisation, of Kim Il-
sung’s heroic fight against the Japanese, and of Korea’s subsequent division into two 
separate states. Amongst the tragedy of conflict and national separation, there are also 
moments for hope. Specifically, Arirang highlights the, ‘Redemptive aesthetics of 
exodus and empowers the prophecy of truth emerging from life in exile’ (Kwon 2010, 
11). Within state produced performances exile is presented as a liminal period through 
which characters must proceed in order to transform their loss into a rebirth. These 
productions are predicated on the twin pillars of exile and redemption within North 
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Korea’s founding myth, that of Kim Il-sung’s own exile to Manchuria and his 
subsequent redemption through vanquishing the Japanese and returning triumphant to 
the homeland (Kim 2010, 72-77). The experiences of national loss, dispersal, and 
redemption are further present throughout the hagiography of the North Korean 
leadership.13 The didactic kernel at the heart of these productions is that exile is a 
transitional space through which a glorious return is both necessary and inevitable. In 
this sense, exodus and exile are required for a patriotic longing to emerge that 
compels a person to return to the homeland.   
Do the redemptive qualities of exile and return also apply to North Koreans 
outside their country? North Koreans who flee for South Korea often find themselves 
at a cross roads, in terms of their cultural identity (Bell 2013, 2014). Many prefer to 
hide their North Korean origins rather than risk rejection by South Koreans. 
Performance is a means for reading the shifting identities of diasporic Koreans, 
suggesting that North Korean refugees embody the divergence and reconciliation of 
individuals experiencing two polarised states contemporaneously (Koo 2016, 390). 
Consequently, performance is a means to illustrate how North Koreans in exile 
negotiate their social positioning by producing a hybridised identity. The result is an 
identity stripped of its overt political ideology and acceptable for South Korean 
audiences.  
The Ch'ongry┙n recital I witnessed suggested a shift in the diasporic identity 
of North Korea-affiliated Koreans in Japan. Reflecting DPRK state performances, in 
terms of ethnic-nationalist content and performers’ bodily comportment, the recital 
                                                        
13 For a thorough treatment of the hagiography of the North Korean leadership see 
Christopher Richardson’s (2017) chapter in Change and Continuity in North Korean Politics.  
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presented a narrative of dispersal and exile.14 However, the performance departed 
from the state narratives seen in Arirang in its omission of a return to the homeland. 
Instead, the symbolism in the school performance illustrated a shift from an ideology 
of return to an ideology of longing. Each of the stars attached to the map of the 
Korean peninsula covered an area of emotional and political significance to the 
DPRK state and the Zainichi Korean community. Within the mnemonic landscape of 
the Korean diaspora, these sites are deployed in the service of the state as a sacred 
geography that connects the political and the imagined community of the citizen both 
at home and abroad.15 The North Korean government locates its founding myth in 
Mount Paektu, on the border with China (Armstrong 1995). It is the site of the Korean 
partisan struggle against the colonial oppressor and ostensibly the birthplace of Kim 
Jong-il, said to have been born during his father’s guerrilla campaign. Further, Korean 
mythology commonly references Mount Paektu as the spiritual home of all the 
Korean people. Pyongyang, represented by a shining red star, is the capital of North 
Korea and the political centre of the putative homeland for Koreans exiled in the land 
of the former coloniser. The inclusion of Pyongyang on the map of an undivided 
Korea sits in bold relief to the absence of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. The red 
                                                        
14 Jung’s description of the Arirang performance as a state display of contour and power in 
which a mass of bodies are arranged and subjected to, ‘a bodily regimen that is designed to 
instill a certain structure of sociality and affect, which anchors the Father in both the body and 
psyche’, is particularly useful for characterising North Korean performance (2013, 96). 
15 For an in depth exploration of the concept of sacred geography see Raphael Samuel (1994) 
Theatres of Memory. For more on the relationship between state ideology and the North 
Korean government’s landscapes of power see Robert Winstanley-Chesters (2014) 
Environment, Politics and Ideology in North Korea: Landscape as Political Project.  
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star on the map indicates the political capital for the exiled North Korea supporting 
community. It is also symbolically synonymous with deceased leader, Kim Il-sung. 
A bright yellow star sits over Cheju Island. A large number of Zainichi 
Koreans now living in Kobe and Osaka originated from the ROK’s most southern 
island.16 The origin story of this transnational community is characterised by a history 
of rebellion and state violence, Cold War ideological polemics, and a series of forced 
migrations to Japan.17 Cheju Island has not been erased from the origin myth of the 
Korean community in Japan because of the island’s ostensible shared political 
affiliations with North Korea. Subsequently, there is no tension between identifying 
Cheju Island as Ch'ongry┙n Koreans’ geographic origins and Pyongyang as the 
ideological point of longing. Having said this, Cheju Island is of secondary 
importance to the political primacy of Pyongyang and the DPRK. 
At the beginning of the performance, the lead dancer plays the role of a 
teacher in a Ch'ongry┙n school. Using the map as a prop, she mimes the story of 
Koreans in Japan. As the ‘teacher’ tells the story, the ‘students’ come alive. They re-
enact the time before Japanese colonisation, playing games and dancing with a 
carefree innocence.18 During this period, Koreans are depicted as untainted and 
                                                        
16 Morris-Suzuki explains that, by the time of the Asia-Pacific War, most Cheju families had 
at least one member living in Japan (2010, 34). 
17 For more on the migration of Koreans from Cheju to Japan and the ideological violence 
that followed colonial rule on the island see Hun Jun Kim (2014), The Massacres at Mt. 
Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea. 
18 The performers’ representation of life in pre-colonial Korea as a carefree, child-like state 
echoes Brian Myers’ reflections on how the North Korean government presents a narrative of 
the ‘cleanest, purest’ race (Myers 2010, 8-9). 
 13 
existing in a prelapsarian state. The movements of the dance, the smiles on the 
children’s faces and the continuous references to the Korean peninsula underline the 
significance of a homeland prior to the loss of sovereignty. The pre-colonial 
homeland is a place where Koreans were free to indulge their childlike spontaneity in 
a Garden of Eden-like environment. The Japanese annexation put an end to the time 
of innocence, as symbolised by the baritone of the offstage string instruments and the 
erratic movements of the dancers. At this point, amongst the chaos and heartbreak of 
Japanese imperial rule, white paper planes launch away from the peninsula. But, from 
Cheju to Mount Paektu, the flimsy aircraft struggle to chart a safe path. At first, the 
audience appears uncertain as to why the non-descript vessels have plummeted to 
their doom. It is only after the students have joined together to create a much larger, 
colourful aeroplane that we realise the significance of the Korean vessels.  
The smaller paper planes represent the individual efforts to survive outside of 
colonial Korea. These featureless vessels are also emblematic of Koreans who lost or 
forgot their Korean culture following emigration. The traditional colours of the larger 
plane and the joint efforts of the performers to ‘fly’ it together underline the necessity 
of maintaining ethnic solidarity outside of the homeland. Japan’s omission from the 
oversized map is of further interest, asto accept the significance of the former 
coloniser in shaping this community would be to acknowledge the diasporic 
characteristics of Zainichi Korean identity. Because Ch'ongry┙n does not allow for a 
hybrid identity, Japan, specifically the Japanese people, cannot feature in the narrative 
of loss and exile. 
The students’ performance illustrated the danger that exile poses to the Korean 
people, threatening to scatter populations and strip them of their ethnic identity. But 
as with North Korean state productions, the Ch'ongry┙n performance also shows that 
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loss and hope are part of the same narrative. While flight from the homeland is a 
heart-wrenching loss, the hope is that Koreans outside the homeland will flourish. But 
such success is only possible if dispersed Koreans keep one eye on each of the sacred 
sites of Pyongyang and Mount Paektu, and remember the benevolence of the 
archetypal Korean-in-exile, Kim Il-sung.  
Ch'ongry┙n Koreans in Japan imagine themselves as both peripheral and 
central to the homeland. They are peripheral in terms of their geographic distance 
from Pyongyang. But their location places the heaviest burden on them to retain their 
ethnic identity in the face of pressure from the host society. This is a burden riddled 
with moral implications, as the host society is also the former coloniser. To resist 
assimilation into Japanese society is to continue Kim Il-sung’s anti-colonial struggle. 
In this sense, Koreans in Japan reimagine the periphery as the frontline of an ethnic 
nationalist struggle for survival that started with the loss of the nation.  
 
The Debt Owed 
 
The Korean community in Japan consists of several waves of migration arriving in 
Japan throughout the twentieth century: Koreans who migrated to Japan during the 
Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and up until the end of the Korean War (1953); 
so-called ‘New-comers’, who arrived in Japan from the late 1980s, when the South 
Korean government liberalised overseas travel for its citizens, students from South 
Korea, and returnees from North Korea who were part of the 1960s mass migration 
from Japan to North Korea (Morris-Suzuki 2007; Bell 2016, 2018). 
The longest established Korean community in Japan is comprised of the 
descendants of Koreans who arrived as labour for the expanding Japanese empire. 
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Some 98 per cent of Koreans to arrive during this period originated from the southern 
half of the peninsula, in particular North and South Ky┙ngsang provinces and Cheju 
Island (Ryang 2000, 5). In the years following the liberation and subsequent division 
of the Korean peninsula, a little over 600,000 Koreans in Japan chose not to return 
home (Ryang 1997, chapter 3). Many Koreans who stayed in Japan politically 
identified with North Korea and regarded Soviet supported Kim Il-sung as more 
politically legitimate than President Syngman Rhee in the American-backed South. 
Rhee’s fervent anti-communism worried many Koreans in Japan. In some cases, they 
stayed in Japan out of fear for their lives in South Korea (Caprio and Jia 2009, 21). 
Often, reports coming out of South Korea about political violence, disease and 
unemployment further dissuaded Koreans from leaving Japan for South Korea.19  
Reproducing the bifurcation of the Korean peninsula, the Korean community 
in Japan split into two major camps, each claiming to represent the rights and welfare 
of Zainichi Koreans. The leftist Chae'il chos┙nin yonmaeng (League of Koreans) was 
formed in October 194520 and was the predecessor to Ch'ongry┙n21. On the other side 
of the political spectrum, the Chae-Ilbon Taehan Min’guk Mindan (Korean Residents 
Union in Japan/Mindan), established on October 3, 1946 was aligned with South 
                                                        
19 B AG 232 105-025 (Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross). 
20 The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) dissolved the League in 1949, 
ostensibly for carrying out Communist activities. Further, the Japanese gov rnment shut 
down 350 ethnic Korean schools supported by the League (Tai 2004, 358).  
21 Ch'ongry┙n (established May 5, 1955) grew out of Minsen, or the ‘United Democratic 
Front of Koreans Residing in Japan’, which itself emerged from the ‘League of Koreans’. 
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Korea. Many Koreans in the post-war period had one foot in each camp and a large 
number were politically unaligned.22  
Japanese colonial policies aimed to assimilate minority imperial subjects into 
Japanese culture by circumscribing their behaviour and everyday life. The attempted 
erasure of Korean cultural practices included forbidding Korean-style clothes, forcing 
Koreans to use Japanese names, and forcibly converting Koreans from Buddhism to 
Shintoism.23 In an effort to undo Japanese indoctrination, in improvised classrooms 
throughout Japan the League of Koreans taught Korean language, history, and 
geography using textbooks written in Korean.24 The number of Korean schools grew 
quickly and, by 1948, some 58,000 students were enrolled in 600 schools across 
Japan (Lee and De Vos 1981, 163). By the late 1950s, North Korea, through 
Ch'ongry┙n, was more active than South Korea in acting as guarantor of the welfare 
                                                        
22 According to the Japanese police, quoted in The Japan Times, of the estimated 580,000 
Korean residents in Japan in 1965, more than 350,000 were pro-Ch'ongry┙n and 230,000 
were registered with Mindan. In the same article, Mindan estimated the number of ‘neutral’ 
Koreans to be around 200,000. Morita, drawing on the Japanese government’s annual 
Residence Foreigner Statistics, notes that by 1974 there were 638,806 Koreans in Japan. The 
350,067 with Kyotei Eiju (permanent residence in Japan) were registered as ROK citizens and 
the remainder (around 288,739) would have been Chosen seki – regarded as stateless by the 
Japanese government (1996, 177). However, these are rough estimates and not clear-cut 
distinctions. 
23 For a thorough account of Japan╆s assimilation policies in Korea see Mark Caprio╆s ゅにどどひょ 
Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea┸ のぶのね-のぶぱひ┻ 
24 For more on the early years of Korean education in Japan see Lee and De Vos  (2006, 
chapter 8), and Inokuchi, in Ryang (ed.) (2000, chapter 7). 
 17 
and education of Koreans in Japan.25 For example, from January 1958 to June 1959, 
the DPRK provided 1.5 million dollars in Japanese yen to fund facilities such as 
banks, hospitals, clinics, and schools.26 In contrast, Mindan had only four schools, 
with around 3,000 students.27 For Ch'ongry┙n, ethnic education, with an emphasis on 
Korean language and history, was a means of preparing Korean children to return to 
the homeland. Lessons in Ch'ongry┙n schools were conducted in Korean with the 
goal of ensuring that students ‘learn that they are overseas nationals of North Korea’ 
(Ryang 1997, 3). Pointing to the organisation’s role in fostering a sense of long 
distance nationalism for Koreans in Japan, even the school buildings constructed by 
Ch'ongry┙n were interpreted as a symbolic reminder to the community of their 
obligation towards the DPRK (Menadue-Chun 2019, forthcoming). In comparison, 
Mindan failed to encourage grassroots support from the Zainichi Korean community; 
it also struggled to solicit funds from the South Korean government (Lee and De Vos 
1981, 124-125). The comparative success of Ch'ongry┙n stemmed from the difference 
in approach of the two organisations. Where Ch'ongry┙n focused on, ‘Maintaining 
and protecting the culture and language of Koreans in Japan’, to paraphrase Chin Kil-
sang, the current director of the organisation 28, Mindan encouraged Koreans to 
assimilate into Japanese society, including taking Japanese citizenship. 
                                                        
25 Lee and De Vos note that, in contrast to Rhee’s South Korea, North Korea’s approach to 
Japan was conciliatory, perhaps as a way of gaining the allegiance of Koreans in Japan and 
driving a wedge between Japan and South Korea (95-97). 
26 B AG 232 105-025 15/07/59-15/07/59, pp.31, International Committee of the Red Cross.  
27 This is according to a December 1965 report in The Japan Times. 
28 Interview with Chin Kil-sang in Tokyo, June 2014.  
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Comprising kindergartens, primary schools, junior and senior high schools and 
a university, Ch'ongry┙n continues to operate the largest ethnic school system in 
Japan.29 However, since 1994, Ch'ongry┙n’s membership has been shrinking.30 A 
growing number of Zainichi Koreans have opted to take Japanese citizenship (Hester 
2000, 182; Tai 2004; Ryang 2016) and, as they have done so, their relationship to the 
DPRK has withered. Zainichi Koreans naturalising as Japanese citizenship reflects a 
tendency for such individuals to see ethnicity as distinct from nationality. The 
implication of this shift is that North Korea-affiliated Zainichi Koreans continue to 
understand themselves a  ethnically Korean, but do not feel the same kind of political 
allegiance to the DPRK. Consequently, more Zainichi Koreans are opting for an 
identity that is independent of Korean and Japanese affiliations (Fukuoka 1993; Tai 
2004; Chapman 2004, 2008; Lie 2008; Shipper 2010). In other words, being ‘Korean-
Japanese’ no longer requires the possession of symbolic items of return to one of the 
Korean states, such as a South Korean passport or an alien card marking an individual 
as ‘Ch┗sen-seki’ (‘North Korean’). 31  In other words, an individual can hold a 
                                                        
29 For more information on the contemporary curriculum offered in a Ch'ongry┙n school see 
the Tokyo Ch┗sen Middle and High School webpage.  
30 Ch'ongry┙n does not release information on its membership but, according to a 2016 report 
in the Asahi news, the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency believes the organisation 
has around 70,000 members (‘Ch┗sens┗renwa yaku 7man-ri’).  
31 ‘Ch┗sen-seki’ is the status assigned to Koreans in Japan who choose neither to naturalise as 
Japanese nor to take South Korean citizenship. It essentially marks them as stateless. The 
Japanese government ascribes this status to ‘North Korean’ residents in Japan because it does 
not recognize North Korea as a sovereign state. For a discussion of nationality and Koreans in 
Japan see Eika Tai (2009) ‘Between Assimilation and Transnationalism: the Debate on 
Nationality Acquisition among Koreans in Japan’. 
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Japanese passport while identifying as Korean. This means that a Korean who takes 
Japanese citizenship can continue to use their Korean name and maintain Korean 
cultural practices while living permanently in Japan. Such changes in the identity 
politics of Zainichi Koreans represents ‘a fundamental shift in the area of postcolonial 
identity formation’ (Ryang 2016, 11). 
Despite a simpler path to naturalisation, however, a number of Ch' ngry┙n 
members still equate it with a rejection of Korean identity and, as such, have no 
intention of taking Japanese citizenship. The association of political and national 
allegiance with the possession of a passport or other signifiers of citizenship, was 
aptly reflected in the lament of Ko Sang-hun, a real estate manager in Kobe,  
Our grandparents struggled so much with unemployment and prejudice from 
the Japanese. But they managed to bring us all together. We used to be so 
strong, here in Japan, but nowadays many people are leaving Ch'ongry┙n. 
They leave and get Japanese passports.  
Sang-hun highlighted two important themes that often arose during my discussions 
with Ch'ongry┙n affiliated Zainichi Koreans: exclusion from the host society and 
feelings of betrayal by individuals who take Japanese or South Korean citizenship. 
For individuals who naturalise, the exchange of symbolic items of return for items 
that speak to an indefinite residency in Japan does not necessitate an abrogation of 
their ethnic identity. In contrast, for Sang-hun and others who express similar views, 
leaving Ch'ongry┙n and becoming a Japanese citizen is a rejection of Korean identity. 
Rejecting Korean identity also means a failure to acknowledge and reciprocate the 
debt owed to North Korea for supporting Zainichi Koreans in the face of 
‘unemployment and prejudice from the Japanese’.  
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Sang-hun used debt idioms to explain the relationship of Zainichi Koreans to 
North Korea. He claimed that the North Korean leadership had supported Koreans in 
Japan when no one else would, and that this demanded ongoing loyalty to the DPRK 
state. Other Ch'ongry┙n members I spoke with agreed with Sang-hun’s sentiments, 
reminding me that North Korea had contributed financial and material support to help 
establish schools and businesses and to ensure employment in Ch'ongry┙n operated 
companies that favoured hiring graduates from Ch'ongry┙n schools. Their relationship 
to North Korea allowed these individuals to maintain their Korean identity when 
confronted by institutionalised pressure to assimilate, and provided comfort and 
solidarity despite discrimination by the Japanese authorities.  
 The debt relationship was manifested in various ways in Tokyo and Kobe 
Ch'ongry┙n schools. For example, references to Kim Il-sung’s benevolence were 
embedded in the students’ craft projects plastered on the walls, and expressed during 
vocal and dance performances. Images of Kim, surrounded by adoring children, hung 
in classrooms. The manifestation of the debt owed to North Korea was visible 
throughout the schools and impressed on the viewer that the school’s loyalties rested 
with the DPRK. The visual representations of the emotional bonds to North Korea, 
however, constituted a considerably muted tone in comparison to the past. Until the 
1990s, Ch'ongry┙n students were required to take ideological lessons designed to 
foster a loyalty to North Korea and the Kim family. A former student I interviewed in 
Osaka recalled her own patriotic education, during which time she learned about Kim 
Il -sung’s exile, his dreams of a Korea free from foreign interference, and his eventual 
return to free the fatherland from the yoke of the Japanese. From 1993, however, 
Ch'ongry┙n redesigned the curriculum to give students a broader understanding of the 
world, while also preparing students for the Japanese university entrance 
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examinations (Ryang 1997, 56-57). Following these reforms, during which the 
teaching of Japanese language and history increased, some parents of students 
expressed concern that Ch'ongry┙n was losing its way.32  
My interlocutors acknowledged the debt owed to North Korea, and it was 
made obvious in the schools I visited. Reproducing the burden of this debt is the 
moral obligation of Ch'ongry┙n-affiliated Zainichi Koreans. To retain a memory of 
the debt is to produce and reproduce the melancholy of separation from a homeland to 
which physical relocation is neither possible nor desired.  
 
North Korea as the Hometown Lost 
 
The concept of ‘hometown’ (furusato), and the affective associations therein are 
helpful for illuminating the shifting positionality of North Korea in the imagination of 
Ch'ongry┙n members. In Japan, furusato is used to refer to the place where a person is 
born, but it is also a powerfully emotive cultural construct that captures a feeling of 
longing for a mythical time and place. Jennifer Robertson notes that furusato is a 
concept that is particularly popular in economically and socially precarious times 
when the future is conceived of as unknown or troubling (1988, 507). The emotive 
pull of the furusato lends itself to supporting disaffected, urban dwelling Japanese by 
imagining a return to a bygone era in which life was simpler. The rapid urbanisation 
of Japan means that the rural hometown has usually changed beyond recognition. 
                                                        
32 The debt relationship that exists between Ch'ongry┙n Zainichi Koreans and North Korea 
was also present during a discussion Ryang had with a concerned parent in Kobe who told 
her, ‘If we were to forget to thank our Great Leader, how would we be able to identify 
ourselves as [North Korean] overseas nationals?’ (1997, 58). 
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Thus, furusato is a slippery concept as it encourages a melancholic longing for a place 
that no longer exists. It is also a deceptive concept, because the hometown, as it is 
nostalgically recalled, is also likely to be very different from how it existed in reality. 
The Korean equivalent of furusato is kohyang. The two terms share the same 
Chinese etymology. Kohyang is defined as, ‘A place deep in your heart that you long 
for’ (Naver dictionary). 33 As a concept that speaks to the loss of one’s self for 
denizens of post-industrial, highly urbanised societies, kohyang has a similarly 
affective tone to furusato. But there are distinctly Korean elements to how kohyang is 
understood34. The concept of kohyang has been shaped by loss on an individual level, 
through the quality of estrangement from modern society. It has further been shaped 
by communal experiences of colonisation. Thus, for Koreans, kohyang is 
contemporaneously experienced as both loss of the hometown and loss of the country. 
Kohyang is consequently a concept encapsulating the melancholy of alienation from 
both the self and from the nation.  
For some Zainichi Koreans, the kohyang as a geographical locale has lost 
much of its meaning. The majority of Koreans who arrived in Japan during the 
colonial era emigrated from what later became South Korea. Many of my 
interlocutors recognised that their forebears had migrated from Ky┙ngsang Province 
or Cheju Island during the colonial era. Over time, however, memories of the 
                                                        
33 Three definitions come up when searching for ‘hometown’ in the Naver dictionary: 1. The 
place where you are born, 2. Your ancestral home, and 3. A place deep in your heart (maum) 
that you long for (translation by the author). 
34 For more discussion on Korean literature and the concept of kohyang see Misun Lee’s 
(1988) post-doctoral research, A Study of Hometown Consciousness in Korean Contemporary 
literature (in Korean).  
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ancestral home have faded. The efforts of Ch'ongry┙n enabled North Korea to fill the 
conceptual lacunae as the kohyang. The paradox is that the distance between the 
Ch'ongry┙n community in Japan and North Korea is necessary to maintain a 
comforting melancholia for the lost homeland. Exile is thus experienced as a 
condition of existential disaffection, in other words, ‘nostalgia for the experience of 
nostalgia’ (Robertson 1988, 497).  
Longing for North Korea is central to Ch'ongry┙n Koreans’ identity as 
Koreans in Japan. The melancholy of exile fosters a feeling of solidarity amongst 
Ch'ongry┙n members, and nostalgia is a communally experienced modality for 
relating to the homeland. As expectations for a return have dissipated, the post-
colonial identity of many ‘North Koreans’ in Japan has shifted towards an affective 
state that keeps the heart in the homeland while the body remains in the land of the 
former coloniser.  
 
Public Faces and Pure Hearts 
 
In order to nurture a post-colonial identity while living in the land of the former 
coloniser, Ch'ongry┙n members produce a dual narrative of belonging. In the official 
narrative, Zainichi Koreans acknowledge the debt accrued for DPRK support. This 
acknowledgement is accompanied by a tacit promise that dispersed Koreans will 
return to the homeland following the reunification of the two Koreas. In this sense, 
‘North Koreans’ in Japan understand themselves as an exiled community that is 
prevented from returning home by obstacles created by interfering foreign powers.  
In the unofficial narrative the debt is also acknowledged, but the ideology of 
return has vanished, replaced by a melancholic nostalgia. The unofficial narrative 
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emphasises the portability of ethnic identity. Because ethnic identity is portable, the 
individual is not required to relocate to North Korea to complete the self-making 
process. We can better understand the expression of these seemingly contradictory 
messages with reference to Jung Hyang-jin’s (2013) binary of ‘public face’ 
(kongj┙gin ┙lgul) and ‘pure heart’ (chinsim). Jung employs this dichotomy to describe 
the self-presentation strategies of North Koreans. ‘Public face’ refers to the highly 
rigid and politicised way of acting in public; this is the official, public performance of 
the self. ‘Pure heart’ refers to the ‘guileless sincerity’ of North Koreans during 
intimate moments when the public face slips. Jung argues that these two modes of 
presentation support each other for the purpose of maintaining loyalty to the North 
Korean state (2013, 87). The bi-furcation of affective behavior is also a helpful means 
for understanding Ch'ongry┙n-affiliated Koreans’ relationship to the imagined 
homeland: a longing for the homeland without the desire to return.  
An affective transnational longing consists of a ‘public face’ of politically 
correct actions that deferentially acknowledge the homeland in speech acts, cultural 
productions, and official gatherings. Ch'ongry┙n members I interviewed lauded the 
achievements of Kim Il-sung. They explained that they felt a deep emotional 
connection (ch┙ng) towards North Korea. One member told me he had named his 
sons after the North Korean leadership. Another told me that, prior to the Japanese 
trade and travel sanctions, he had made numerous trips to North Korea and that his 
brother had even met Kim Il-sung, receiving a Rolex watch as a mark of recognition 
for his activism in Japan. But crediting state support for helping Koreans maintain 
their ethnic identity—publically acknowledging the debt—does not mean these 
individuals desire to return to North Korea. In a discussion I had with a teacher in an 
Osaka Ch'ongry┙n school my interlocutor and his friend, both members of 
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Ch'ongry┙n and both having made multiple trips to North Korea, agreed, ‘North 
Korea is a horrible country’. Neither of my interviewees had any desire to live in the 
DPRK. In moments such as these, the public face slips and the performance is 
momentarily suspended. 
Running parallel to a public face is a ‘pure heart’. When the public face slips, 
it reveals an alternative rendering of the homeland for Koreans in Japan. The pure 
heart reconceptualises the homeland as an idealised space, but acknowledges that 
home for Zainichi Koreans is Japan. The dance displayed elements of both public face 
and pure heart. North Korean support was acknowledged as the progenitor of the 
ethnic identity for Koreans in Japan. The debt to each of the sacred places—the 
spiritual home (Mount Paektu), the political home (Pyongyang), and the geographical 
home (Cheju Island)—were acknowledged during the dance. But the dance did not 
conclude with a return to the kohyang. Instead, the performance inferred, through the 
successful launching of a distinctly Korean vessel, that life in Japan is an acceptable 
conclusion to exile. Having said this, life in Japan is only accepted on the condition 
that Koreans who do not return to the homeland continue to long for the homeland. 
Subsequently, the transnational moral obligation of Zainichi Koreans is to produce 
and reproduce the melancholy of separation from the homeland. These two modes of 
behaviour, the public face and the pure heart, unite and then overlap diasporic ethnic 
communities ruptured by colonial exploitation and geo-political friction.  
 
Conclusion: An Affective Transnational Longing 
 
This paper has delineated the affective characteristics of North Korea-affiliated 
Koreans’ hybrid, post-colonial identity. Koreans in Japan are not a deterritorialised 
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ethnic minority, independent from both the homeland and the host society. On the 
contrary, I have argued that my interlocutors straddle two worlds as they intimately 
connect to both North Korea and Japan through an affective transnational imagining 
of time and space.  
Ch'ongry┙n-affiliated Koreans draw on DPRK state mythology, with exile and 
redemption as central themes, to express their communality with the homeland, while 
also explaining and justifying their location on the periphery. This requires 
negotiating an apparent contradiction, in that they long for North Korea without 
desiring to return. They achieve this by reimagining North Korea not as a geo-
political space, but as the symbol, par excellence, of Korean identity, at the heart of 
which is the inevitability of exile. Subsequently, to embody a longing for the 
homeland through the production and reproduction of a Korean cultural citizenship is 
to stake a claim to a redemption that would usually be reserved only for those who 
return from exile. I have suggested that the diasporic identity of Ch'ongry┙n Koreans 
in Japan is best conceived of as an affective transnational longing. The transnational 
longing for North Korea is, by necessity, a painful state because without an attendant 
sense of loss, Ch'ongry┙n Koreans must accept their exiled status, and risk conceding 
that they have turned their back on the homeland.   
The dance recital, the images on the school walls, and the cultural 
performances that I observed presented the contemporary relationship of diasporic 
Koreans to North Korea for an audience of Ch'ongry┙n members. The performance 
underlined that everyday events in intimate, community spaces are a means of 
marking and constructing transnational identity. The performance recalled the 
dispersal and subsequent formation of Korean communities outside of the homeland, 
and the creation of material and kinship links between Japan and North Korea.  
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Ch'ongry┙n Koreans continue to identify with North Korea, but now a dual 
narrative of transnational imagining characterises the relationship. On the one hand, 
Ch'ongry┙n Koreans acknowledge a debt towards North Korea for years of financial 
and material support. The promise of return features centrally in this official narrative. 
But, because return is neither possible nor desirable, a second, affective narrative has 
emerged. The affective narrative underlines the portability of ethnic identity and 
instead permits belonging through a sincere longing for the homeland. Alongside an 
ethnic identity constructed around the ideology of return emerges a communal ‘pure 
heart’ identity in which a nostalgic longing for the homeland defines the relationship 
of displaced Koreans to a romanticised North Korea. Ch'ongry┙n members’ ideology 
of return to the homeland has retreated into the background, replaced by an emotional 
connection to an idealised place that is both out of time and out of space. 
Subsequently, Ch'ongry┙n Koreans reimagine North Korea in a similarly 
nostalgic way as the pre-modern hometown is conceived of for disaffected urban 
dwellers. The North Korea that was communally imagined and performed in the 
recital has a similar, emotive affect on the individual as the furusato or kohyang. 
North Korea as the mythic kohyang shapes the ethnic identity of Ch' ngry┙n Koreans 
in Japan. At the centre of contemporary Zainichi Korean identity is nostalgia for a 
time and a place that has only ever existed in the imagination—a hometown providing 
comfort and reassurance when the Korean community in Japan is shaken by 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: A dancer gestures to the map of the Korean peninsula 
Figure 2: Students perform the carefree moments before the exodus  
Figure 3: Dancers celebrate as the Korean plane soars high above the stage 
 
 
 
